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INTRODUCTION 
This article summarizes a federal case involving an American 
Indian1 Tribe’s claim to more than 270,000 acres of California land.  
The plaintiff, the Kawaiisu Tribe of the Tejon, sought the right to 
occupy and use the land, claiming it held valid title.  The Tribe 
contended the United States guaranteed the land to them both through 
the 1849 Treaty with the Utah and the Tejon Indian Reservation in 
1853.2 The Tribe’s legal hurdle was the defendants’ valid land patents 
from predecessors in title, originating from the end of the Mexican-
American War.  The case required examining California history, United 
States treaties with American Indians, the rights of land owners, and 
their intersection with American Indians.  This article summarizes the 
parties’ legal and factual arguments, and the Court’s holdings in 
adjudicating the claims and rights to the land.3 
                                                          
1.  While some people may be offended by the use of the word “Indian” when 
referring to Native Americans, the Kawaiisu Tribe, which is the subject of this article, 
refers to themselves as “Indian.” Out of respect for the Kawaiisu Tribe, this article 
adopts the Tribe’s chosen nomenclature. 
2.  The 270,000 acres is located off of Interstate 5, north of Los Angeles and 
before Bakersfield.  The Tejon Pass is at elevation of about 4,000 feet, where the sign 
for the “Tejon Ranch” is located on Interstate 5, and the 270,000 acres partly borders 
Interstate 5 and continues east. 
3.  These legal issues were presented to the Court in the form of a series of 
motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. The trial court rulings were upheld on appeal. More 
information about the Court’s rulings and appeal by the parties can be found at: 
Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006 *E.D. Cal. 2012); Robinson v. Salazar, 
885 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (E.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 
910 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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I. THE PARTIES IN THE TRIBE’S CASE 
 The Kawaiisu Tribe of the Tejon (“Tribe” or “Kawaiisu”) is an 
American Indian tribe that had “resided in the State of California since 
time immemorial.”  Plaintiff David Laughing Horse Robinson is the 
Chairman of the Kawaiisu Tribe of Tejon4 and brought suit on behalf 
of the Tribe (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”).  The Tribe 
contended it “descends from signatories to the 1849 Treaty with the 
Utah and the ‘Utah tribe of Indians’ that was recognized by the 
government of the United States in that treaty,” and that they are 
descendants of the Indians for whom the 1853 Tejon/Sebastian 
Reservation was created.5 The Kawaiisu claimed to be one of the 
ancient Great Basin Shoshone Paiute tribes whose pre-colonial territory 
extended from Utah to the Pacific Ocean.6 The Kawaiisu has inhabited 
the Tejon area of California from “time immemorial.”7 Throughout 
history, Kawaiisu people have been called any one or more of the 
following names: Nochi, Cobaji, Cobajais, Covaji, Kahwissah, 
Kawiasuh, Kawishm, Kowasah, Kubakhye, Newooah, Noches 
Colteches, Tahichapahanna, Tahichp.8 The Tribe has allegedly enrolled 
approximately 500 individuals who are all related either by blood or 
adoption.9 They are the Kawaiisu Tribe’s leaders’ descendants who 
signed the Treaty with the Utah in 1849.10 The Kawaiisu also descend 
from the American Indian tribe encountered by Father Garces in or 
about 1776.11 Father Garces discussed the American Indian tribe in his 
                                                          
4.  Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Note 
that during the litigation, and as will be continued in this article, the Court referred to 
the Kawaiisu as the “Tribe,” for convenience. A major dispute between the parties in 
the case was whether, in fact, the Kawaiisu is a “Tribe.”   
5.  Id. at 1012. 
6.  Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for: (1) Unlawful Possession, etc.; (2) 
Equitable Enforcement of Treaty; (3) Violation of Nagpra; (4) Deprivation of Property 
in Violation of the 5th Amendment; (5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (6) Non-Statutory 
Review; and (7) Denial of Equal Protection in Violation of the 5th Amendment ¶ 32, 
Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 1:09-cv-01977), 
2012 WL 12057256 [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint].   
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 15. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
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diary and noted it in his diseno maps as: Cobaji, Cobajaef, Cobajais, 
Covaji, Quabajai, Nochi, Nochis and Noches Colteches.12 
The defendants in the Tribe’s case, Tejon Mountain Village 
(“TMV”) and Tejon Ranch Corporation (“TRC”), are private entities 
that claimed to hold valid land patents from predecessors in title and 
interest in the 270,000 acres of the Tribe’s claimed portion of the 
reservation and its aboriginal lands.13 The defendants intended to 
develop “Tejon Mountain Village” with commercial and residential 
development. 
II. THE TRIBE’S CLAIMS TO THE LAND 
The Tribe based its claim to the land on two theories: (1) the 
aboriginal right to occupy the land and (2) title to the land.14 
A.  The Tribe’s Claims Regarding the Right to Occupy 
The Tribe claimed a right to occupy some or all of the 270,000 acres 
based upon three asserted rights: (1) aboriginal rights, which is the right 
to occupy the land, (2) treaty rights, which purportedly granted the 
Kawaiisu the permissive right to occupy, and (3) reservation rights.15 
First, the Tribe asserted its right to occupy the land based upon 
aboriginal rights, claiming it descended from the Shoshone Paiute tribes 
whose territory extended from Utah to the Pacific Ocean.16 The Tribe 
claimed to have inhabited the area from time immemorial,17 and that its 
                                                          
12.  Id. 
13.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 257 (“[TMV and TRC] claim 
title to approximately 270,000 acres of land located in and around Kern County, 
California, commonly known as Tejon Ranch, based on four alleged Mexican land 
grants, for Rancho La Liebre, Rancho Los Alamos y Agua Caliente, Rancho El Tejon 
and Rancho Castac.”).  
14.  See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 283. 
15.  See id. ¶ 1 (“Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to vindicate their rights to land . . . 
that the United States guaranteed their right to occupy and use pursuant to the 1849 
Treaty with the Utahs and by establishing the Tejon Indian Reservation in 1853.”). 
16.   See id. ¶ 32.  
17.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 32 (“[T]he KAWAIISU TRIBE 
OF TEJON is one of the ancient Great Basin Shoshone Paiute Tribes whose pre-
European territory extended from Utah to the Pacific Ocean. They have inhabited this 
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aboriginal title had encompassed 270,000 acres or 49,000 acres, which 
comprised the 1858 Survey of the Tejon/Sebastian reservation.18 
Second, the Tribe claimed it was granted treaty rights to occupy the 
land.19 The Bureau of Indian Affairs did not federally-recognize the 
Tribe, but the Tribe claimed to be federally-recognized by virtue of the 
1849 Treaty with the Utah, which was ratified by Congress20 and by 
virtue of Treaty D.21 The Tribe claimed to have descended from the 
“signatories to the Treaty with the Utah.”22 The Tribe entered into 
Treaty D with the United States in 1851 and agreed to cede large 
portions of its land in exchange for a reservation, among other things.23 
The Tribe believed the Senate secretly neglected to ratify Treaty D to 
allow American Indian territory to be exploited.24 
Finally, the Tribe asserted its right to occupy the land by virtue of 
its reservation.25 The Tribe claimed that on March 3, 1853, Congress 
authorized the United States President to create “five military 
                                                          
area from time immemorial. Since time immemorial, the Kawaiisu have been bound 
together by family, language, territory, trade and ceremonial practices.”).   
18.  Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 34-35, Robinson v. Salazar, 838 
F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 1:09-cv-01977), ECF No. 133 [hereinafter 
Second Amended Complaint]. 
19.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 89 (“Plaintiffs are informed and 
believe and thereon allege, before California was admitted to the Union, the Tribe’s 
ancestors were signatories to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Utah Indians, known as Treaty with the Utahs.”). 
20.  Treaty with the Utah, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, 1849 WL 7601.  
21.  Treaty Made and Concluded at Camp Persifer F. Smith, at the Texan Pass, 
State of California, June 10, 1851, between George W. Barbour United States 
Commissioner, and the Chiefs, Captains, and Head Men of the “Castake,” “Texon,” 
&c, Tribes of Indians, June 10, 1851, Hearings before the Comm. Indian Affairs, 66th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., at 18-19 (Mar. 23, 1920) [hereinafter Treaty D]; see CHARLES J. 
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFF. L. AND TREATIES 1101 (1913-1927). 
22.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 20 (“The Tribe and its 
members are descendants of, among others, Acaguate nochi, Cobaxanor, Nochichigue 
and Panachi, signatories to the Treaty with the Utahs.”). 
23.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 25.  
24.  Id. (“While at all times the Tribe relied upon this treaty as if it were in force, 
the Senate secretly neglected to ratify this treaty so that these lands could be open for 
exploitation, un-encumbered by claims of Indian title, for the hordes of settlers 
moving west for the gold-rush.”). 
25.  Id. ¶ 25.  
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reservations for the protection of Indians” in the State of California.26 
In 1853, Congress established a reservation for the Kawaiisu’s 
benefit.27 The reservation was established at Tejon Pass for the Tejon 
Indians, and was resurveyed in 1858.28 At one time, the Kawaiisu 
occupied 75,000 acres.29 In 1858, the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation was 
resurveyed to 49,928 acres.30 
The Tribe responded to the TRC and TMV’s land patents by 
alleging that, in 1856, California Indian Superintendent Edward F. 
Beale falsified the land patents for the 270,000 acres, which now 
encompasses the Tejon Ranch and the Tribe’s aboriginal land.31 Then, 
the American Indians in the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation were forced 
to move to the Tule Reservation.32 The Tribe alleged that, “[t]o the 
extent that any title descending from Beale’s self-appointed patents has 
deprived the Tribe of lands, which the Tribe historically occupied or 
lands reserved pursuant to the 1853 executive order,” the title is 
unlawful.33 The Tribe argued only an act of Congress can terminate a 
reservation, and no act of Congress terminated the reservations 
established in 1853.34 
                                                          
26.  Id. ¶ 26; Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 226 (appropriating for 
fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with various Indian Tribes).  
27.  Id. ¶¶ 26-27.  
28.  Id. ¶ 27 (“On September 30, 1853, California Indian Superintendent Edward 
F. Beale communicated to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny, 
that he had established a reservation at Tejon Pass for the Tejon Indians pursuant to 
the Act of March 3, 1853.”). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31. Id. ¶ 28 (“To the extent that any title descending from Beale’s self-appointed 
patents has deprived the Tribe of lands, which the Tribe historically occupied or lands 
reserved pursuant to the 1853 executive order, such deprivation was not approved by 
any action of either the United States or Congress and was therefore unlawful.”). 
32.  Id. (“Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that in or about 
1856, ex-superintendent Beale and others drew up patents under old Spanish land 
grants for the approximately 270,000 acres that now comprises Tejon Ranch, all of 
which was within the Tribe’s aboriginal land, including most or all of the land covered 
by the original Tejon/Sebastian Reservation. Some of the Indians located on the 
Tejon/Sebastian Reservation were then forcibly removed to the Tule Reservation.”).  
33.  Id.  
34.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 29 (“Plaintiffs are informed 
and believe and thereon allege that no acts of termination with respect to the 1853 
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B. “Title” to the 270,000 Acres 
As an alternative argument to its right to occupy, the Tribe claimed 
“ownership” or “title” to the 270,000 acres of land.35 The Tribe claimed 
ownership based on treaty rights, which purportedly granted the 
Kawaiisu title to the land and reservation rights.36 The Kawaiisu 
claimed title to Tejon Ranch through the Treaty with the Utah, which 
was signed on December 30, 1849, ratified by the Senate on September 
9, 1850, and “elucidated” by Treaty D.37 The Kawaiisu also claimed 
superior title to the Tejon/Sebastian Indian Reservation 
(“Tejon/Sebastian Reservation”), which encompasses approximately 
49,000 acres, as shown on the 1858 Survey of the Reservation and 
constitutes a portion of Tejon Ranch.38 Further, the Kawaiisu claimed 
title to the Tejon Reservation according to Congress’ Act of March 3, 
1853 (the “1853 Act”),39 and the Tejon Reservation’s establishment 
thereafter.40 
                                                          
reservation as established by Beale have ever been affirmed, nor has there been an act 
of termination identifying the Tribe by any of its names.”). 
35.   Id. ¶ 283.  
36.  See id. (explaining that the theories of (1) treaty rights and (2) reservation 
rights overlapped with the Tribe’s’ arguments that the Tribe had the “right to occupy” 
the land). 
37.  Id. ¶ 28; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 89, 110-113; see 
Treaty D, supra note 21, at art 3-4; 4 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFF. L. AND 
TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 20; see 
also H.R. DOC. NO. 736, at 782-83 (1899). 
38.  Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Tejon Ranchcorp and Tejon 
Mountain Village LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 
7, Robinson v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (2012) (No. 1:09-cv-01977), 2012 WL 
13035231 (“Federal Government did not issue patents for the all land that TRC claims 
to own, much less for the entire area of the Reservation, but rather that in 1865—after 
Beale established the Reservation—he and others forged patents for the land that TRC 
claims to own that this forged title to the land eventually passed to Tejon.”); Third 
Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 294-304. 
39.  Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 226, 238. 
40.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 128-133. 
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III. ABORIGINAL TITLE, THE ACT OF 1851, AND THE TREATY OF 
GUADALUPE HIDALGO 
A. Aboriginal Title 
The common view of aboriginal title recognizes the right of 
occupancy held by tribes.41 American Indians’ aboriginal title derives 
from their presence on the land before white settlers arrived.42 It is well-
settled that, in all States, the tribes who inhabited lands held claim to 
their lands after the arrival of white settlers, under what is sometimes 
termed “original Indian title” or “permission from the whites to 
occupy.”43 Fee title to the lands vested in the United States when the 
colonists arrived, but the tribes’ right of occupancy remained.44 
However, Congress did not recognize American Indian tribes’ mere 
land possession as land ownership.  This means the American Indians 
did not hold a property right, but simply a right of occupancy, which 
the sovereign grants to protect against intrusion by third parties.45 The 
sovereign may still terminate the right of occupancy and fully dispose 
of the lands without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate 
                                                          
41.  See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974); 
United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1989).   
42.  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).   
43.  Id. (“After conquest they were permitted to occupy portions of territory over 
which they had previously exercised ‘sovereignty,’ as we use that term. This is not a 
property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants and 
protects against intrusion by third parties but which right of occupancy may be 
terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally 
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.”). 
44.  Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 667 (“It very early became accepted 
doctrine in this Court that although fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the 
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign—first the discovering European 
nation and later the original States and the United States—a right of occupancy in the 
Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes called Indian title 
and good against all but the sovereign, could be terminated only by sovereign act. 
Once the United States was organized and the Constitution adopted, these tribal rights 
to Indian lands became the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, 
recognized to be only a right of occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United 
States. The Federal Government took early steps to deal with the Indians through 
treaty, the principal purpose often being to recognize and guarantee the rights of 
Indians to specified areas of land.”). 
45.  Id. 
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American Indians.46 The federal government may extinguish aboriginal 
title at any time, but such extinguishment will not be taken lightly.47 
Congress’s power to extinguish aboriginal title is supreme, “whether it 
be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of 
complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or 
otherwise . . . .”48 
B. Overview of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 1851 Act 
The Act of 1851 followed the cessation of hostilities with Mexico 
in the Mexican-American War and culminated in the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.49 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed and 
effectuated in 1848, signaled the formal end of the Mexican-American 
War.50 In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico ceded parts of 
present-day California to the United States.51 United States courts have 
uniformly held that title to the land first passed to the United States 
government through the Treaty.52 
To settle any land claims in the newly-acquired territory from 
Mexico, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1851 (“1851 Act”).53 The 
1851 Act created a Board of Commissioners to determine the validity 
of land claims, and required each person “claiming lands in California 
by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican 
government” to present the claim within two years.54 
                                                          
46.  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279. 
47.  United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
Wilson v. United States, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).   
48.  United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941). 
49.  Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Mex.-U.S., May 30, 
1848, 9 Stat. 922, 1848 WL 6374 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. 
50.  See id. (showing that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed by the 
United States and Mexico on February 2, 1848, and effectuated on May 30, 1848); 
see also United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1986).   
51.   Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 49. 
52.  See, e.g., United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 34 n.3 (1978) (stating 
that, under the Treaty, “all nongranted lands previously held by the Government of 
Mexico passed into the federal public domain”). 
53.  Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (ascertaining private land claims in 
California).  
54.  Act of Mar. 3 1851, ch. 41, § 8, 9 Stat. 631; Chunie, 788 F.2d at 641.   
9
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The 1851 Act deemed any land not claimed within two years, and 
any land for which a claim was rejected, as “part of the public domain 
of the United States.”55 Under the 1851 Act, the purpose of the Board 
of Commissioners was to provide and grant clear title to land presented 
to it for resolution.56 The Board’s determinations regarding the issued 
land patents “shall be conclusive between the United States and the said 
claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.”57 
C.  Cases in Which American Indians Lost the Right of Occupancy 
Under the 1851 Act 
It is against this backdrop that TMV and TRC argued the Tribe’s 
claim to the land was barred.58 TRC argued its title to the land is readily 
traceable from land grants made by the Mexican government to private 
parties before 1848.59 Additionally, TRC claimed the land grants were 
confirmed by the United States after Mexico ceded the land; this is 
evidenced by a United States land patent.60 TMV and TRC argued the 
Tribe had lost its aboriginal title by failing to comply with the 
requirements of the 1851 Act.61 However, the Tribe claimed it is 
exempt from the 1851 Act by its aboriginal title.62 
In Barker v. Harvey, the Supreme Court held Mission Indians lost 
their land claims because they failed to comply with the 1851 Act.63 
Barker involved a dispute between individuals and Mission Indians 
                                                          
55.  Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, § 13, 9 Stat. 631. 
56.  Act of Mar. 3 1851, ch. 41, § 8, 9 Stat. 631. 
57.  See id. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Tejon Defendants’ Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 5, Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 
1006 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 1:09-cv-01977), ECF No. 140. (“Plaintiffs are barred from 
challenging TRC’s title under any legal theory. Consistent with Plaintiffs’ allegations, 
title to TRC’s land is readily traceable from land grants made by the Mexican 
government to private parties prior to 1848 and confirmed by the United States after 
the land was ceded by Mexico to United States, as evidenced by a United States 
patent.”). 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. at 7-8.  
62.  Id. 
63.  Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490, 499 (1901). 
10
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claiming title to the same land.64 The individuals claimed the land was 
ceded to the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
and through a patent confirming the Mexican government’s grants to 
the individuals’ ancestor in title.65 The Mission Indians argued the 
individuals’ title was subject to the right of permanent occupancy 
because they believed the Mexican government recognized such a right 
long before the existence of the individuals’ grants.66 Further, the 
Mission Indians claimed the “government of Mexico had always 
recognized the lawfulness and permanence of their occupancy.”67 The 
Supreme Court upheld the individuals’ land patents over the Mission 
Indians’ pre-existing aboriginal title because the Mission Indians had 
not presented their claims to the 1851 Board of Commissioners.68 The 
Court held the 1851 Act barred the Mission Indians’ land claims 
because the Mission Indians failed to timely present their claims to the 
Board of Commissioners for consideration.69 “If these Indians had any 
claims founded on the action of the Mexican government they 
abandoned them by not presenting them to the commission for 
consideration.”70 
Similarly, in United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., the Court held 
the Tejon Mission Indians lost their rights to land for failure to present 
their claim to the Board of Commissioners under the 1851 Act. 71 In 
1843, the Mexican government of California granted a land grant to two 
Mexicans for El Tejon conditioned upon the protection of the American 
Indians residing in the land.72 The laws of Spain and Mexico entitled 
the two Mexican citizens to undisturbed possession and use of the land 
they occupied.73 After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the two 
                                                          
64.  Id. at 482. 
65.  Id. at 482, 490. 
66.  Id. at 482, 491. 
67.  Id. at 482.   
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 491. 
71.  United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 484 (1924) (“[A] right 
to permanent occupancy of land is one of far-reaching effect, and it could not well be 
said that lands which were burdened with a right of permanent occupancy were a part 
of the public domain and subject to the full disposal of the United States.”). 
72.  United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 288 F. 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1923).  
73.  Id.   
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Mexicans petitioned the Board of Commissioners under the 1851 Act 
to settle their claim, and the Commissioners confirmed the two 
Mexicans’ land patent.74 Thereafter, in Title Ins., the United States sued 
on behalf of the Tejon Mission Indians who occupied land in the El 
Tejon Rancho in Kern County.75 The Tejon Mission Indians claimed 
that “[f]rom time immemorial the land has been continuously occupied 
by the Tejon Indians, who have resided thereon in permanent 
dwellings . . . .”76 The Tejon Mission Indians were in open, notorious, 
and adverse occupancy of such lands at the date of the grant.77 The 
United States’ lawsuit, on behalf of the Tejon Mission Indians, sought 
to confirm the original title of occupancy and the Tejon Mission 
Indians’ possession of the disputed land.78 The Tejon Mission Indians 
argued the land was subject to their and their descendants’ “perpetual 
right” to occupy and use the land.79 
In Title Ins., the Supreme Court based its prior decision on Barker 
v. Harvey, the Tejon Mission Indians lost their claim in Title Ins. 
because they failed to timely present their claims to the Board of 
Commissioners.80 The two Mexicans citizens’ patents “passed the full 
title, unencumbered by any right” of those Mission Indians.81 After 
summarizing, quoting, and analogizing Barker, the Supreme Court 
determined the result in Title Ins. must be the same.82 Accordingly, the 
Court affirmed the judgment against the Tejon Mission Indians.83 The 
Court also said the United States would have been unable to grant the 
                                                          
74.  Id. 
75.  See Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Tejon Ranch 
Corporation and Tejon Mountain Village’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 
Amended Complaint at 11 n.6., Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (No.1:09-cv-01977), 2011 WL 13239275 (claiming they are Tejon Mission 
Indians and are not related in any fashion to the Tejon Mission Indians). 
76.  Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. at 472.  
77.  Id. 
78.  United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 288 F. 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1923). 
79.  United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 482 (1924). 
80.  Id.; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 491 (1901). 
81.  Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. at 481. 
82.  Id. at 485-86.  
83.  Id.  
12
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two Mexicans citizens’ land patents if the Tejon Mission Indians had a 
claim of permanent occupancy.84 
In United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, the Ninth Circuit held 
the Chumash Indian Tribe lost all of its aboriginal land rights by failing 
to present and confirm their land claims pursuant to the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 1851 Act.85 The Chumash Indian Tribe 
claimed possession of islands off the Santa Barbara coast.86 The 
Mexican government also granted these same islands to individuals 
who submitted claims to the Board of Commissioners, which the Board 
of Commissioners confirmed.87 A century later, the Chumash Indian 
Tribe disputed the land patents and claimed the 1851 Act did not apply 
to American Indian claims based on aboriginal title.88 Like the 
Kawaiisu’s case, the Chumash Indian Tribe claimed it was exempt from 
the Board of Commissioner’s confirmation proceedings, because it 
possessed the land “from time immemorial,” and that it’s aboriginal 
title had never been extinguished.89 It also argued they had the right of 
occupancy notwithstanding the land patents, and it was not required to 
submit a land claim under the 1851 Act.90 The Chumash Indian Tribe 
contended the 1851 Act only required persons claiming lands “by virtue 
of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government” 
to file claims and that the Chumash Indian Tribe was not required to 
file a claim under the 1851 Act, because aboriginal title is not “derived 
from the Spanish or Mexican government.”91 
                                                          
84.  Id. at 484 (“There is an essential difference between the power of the United 
States over lands to which it had had full title, and of which it has given to an Indian 
tribe a temporary occupancy, and that over lands which were subjected by the action 
of some prior government to a right of permanent occupancy, for in the latter case the 
right, which is one of private property, antecedes and is superior to the title of this 
government, and limits necessarily its power of disposal.”). 
85.  United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1986). 
86.  Id. at 641. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id.  
90.  Id. at 645. 
91.  Id. 
13
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The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a claim of aboriginal title 
provided American Indians with a “right of occupancy.”92 But after 
reviewing Supreme Court precedent, which recognized the 1851 Act’s 
“extensive reach,” the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Chumash Indian 
Tribe.93 The Court held American Indians “claiming a right of 
occupancy based on aboriginal title, lost all rights in the land when they 
failed to present a claim to the commissioners.”94 The Court stated 
when the individuals’ land claims derived from the Mexican 
government were “confirmed and received federal patents to their 
lands, [the individuals] were entitled to believe that adverse claims to 
their lands had been eliminated.”95 Thus, in Ringrose, the Court held 
aboriginal title had been extinguished because the Chumash Indian 
Tribe failed to present its claim for the islands with the Board of 
Commissioners pursuant to the 1851 Act.96 
D.  The Kawaiisu Lost the Right to Occupy Under the 1851 Act 
Thus, case law holds that aboriginal title is lost when land patents 
are validly issued to predecessors in title.97 The Kawaiissu’s claims to 
occupancy are invalid because of validly-issued land patents by the 
Board of Commissioners under the 1851 Act.98 As stated in Title Ins., 
the United States would have been unable to grant the TMV and TRC’s 
land patents had the Tribe timely claimed permanent occupancy.99 “[A] 
claim of a right to permanent occupancy of land is one of far reaching 
                                                          
92.  Id. at 642 (“Despite this right of occupancy, the conquering government 
acquires the exclusive right to extinguish Indian title.”). 
93.  Id. at 646. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. (“This result comports with the overriding purpose of the Act of 1851 
‘to place the titles to land in California upon a stable foundation . . . in a manner and 
form that will prevent future controversy.’”). 
96.  Id.; see Super v. Work, 3 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1925); see also Super v. 
Work, 271 U.S. 643, 646 (1926) (explaining that because roving bands of Indians, 
who were not Mission Indians, did not make claim under the act of 1851, must 
therefore be treated as having lost, through abandonment, any claim which they may 
have had). 
97.  Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901); see Ringrose, 788 F.2d at 646; see 
generally United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924).  
98.  Ringrose, 788 F.2d at 646. 
99.  Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. at 484. 
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effect . . . .”100 As the Supreme Court noted, there would be “little 
reason for presenting to the land commission his claim to land, and 
securing a confirmation of that claim, if the only result was to transfer 
the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian right of permanent 
occupancy.”101 Thus, clear and unburdened title was granted by the 
1851 Act’s Board of Commissioners. 
In the Tribe’s case, the United States issued land patents to TMV 
and TRC’s predecessors in title for the same land that the Tribe 
claimed.102 The Supreme Court’s holding in Title Ins. stated that such 
land patents provided clear title to TMV and TRC.103 The Tribe could 
not challenge the validity of the land patents issued by the United States 
after more than a century of time has elapsed.104 Thus, the Tribe lost 
any claims to its aboriginal title because it failed to submit a claim to 
the Board of Commissioners under the 1851 Act. 
IV. TREATY WITH THE UTAH 
The Tribe also alleged the Treaty with the Utah granted them vast 
land rights as “elucidated” by Treaty D.105 The Tribe argued that the 
                                                          
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6 (plaintiffs acknowledged that 
land patents were issued to Tejon Defendants’ predecessor by the United States for 
the land at issue); id. ¶ 25 (“Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege, the 
claim for Rancho El Tejon was ultimately confirmed and a patent was issued on May 
9, 1863 to Aguirre and Del Valle for 97,616.78 acres.”); id. ¶ 259 (“Plaintiffs are 
informed and believe and thereon allege, the claim for Rancho La Liebre was 
ultimately confirmed and a patent was issued on June 21, 1875 to J.M Flores for 
48,799.59 acres.”); id. ¶ 260 (“Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege, 
the claim for Rancho los Alamos y Agua Caliente was ultimately confirmed and a 
patent was issued on November 9, 1866 to A. Olevara and others for 26,626.23 
acres.”); id. ¶ 261 (“Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege, the claim 
for Rancho Castac was ultimately confirmed and a patent was issued on November 
27, 1866 to J.M. Covarrubias for 22,178.28 acres.”).  
103.  Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see 
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. at 484. 
104.  See id. (“Where questions arise which affect titles to land, it is of great 
importance to the public that, when they are once decided, they should no longer be 
considered open.”). 
105.  Treaty D, supra note 21, at art. 3, 4; see 4 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN 
AFF. L. AND TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927). 
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Treaty with the Utah granted the Tribe both the right to occupy and title 
to land.106 
A.  Legal Framework - Treaties 
Supreme Court jurisprudence teaches that American Indian treaties 
must be interpreted as the American Indians would have understood 
them.107 A treaty between the United States and an American Indian 
tribe “is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations.”108 
Treaties constitute the “supreme law of the land.”109 In Choctaw Nation 
v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and agree upon 
an exchange of lands in an arm’s length transaction. Rather, treaties 
were imposed upon them and they had no choice but to consent.  As 
a consequence, this Court has often held that treaties with the Indians 
must be interpreted as they would have understood them . . . .110 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the United 
States has an obligation to carry out treaty terms, as the American 
Indians would have understood it, with “a spirit which generously 
recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a 
dependent people.”111 Any unclear Treaty provisions should be 
interpreted in favor of American Indians.112 
                                                          
106.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 258. 
107.  See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979); see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 
620, 630-31 (1970).  
108.  Id. at 675.   
109.  Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506, 512 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090 (2006). 
110.  See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. at 631. 
111.  Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); see also United States 
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) (“[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians 
as ‘that unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason demand . . . .’”). 
112.  See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) 
(a tribe may also have treaty rights which are independent of formal government 
recognition, as the Kawaiisu claimed); see, e.g., United States v. Washington, 520 
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (“Nonrecognition of the 
tribe by the federal government and the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to 
approve a tribe’s enrollment may result in loss of statutory benefits, but can have no 
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/2
McAuliffe camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:11 AM 
2018] STOLEN OR LAWFUL? 17 
B. Treaty with the Utah Neither Applied in  
California nor Reserved Land 
In the Treaty with the Utah, the Utah Indians submitted to the 
jurisdiction, power, and authority of the United States.113 The Treaty 
states: “The Utah Tribe of Indians do hereby acknowledge and declare 
they are lawfully and exclusively under the jurisdiction of the 
Government of said States.”114 In pertinent part, the Treaty provides 
that: 
[T]he aforesaid Government shall, at its earliest convenience, 
designate, settle, and adjust their territorial boundaries . . . . And the 
said Utahs, further, bind themselves not to depart from their 
accustomed homes or localities unless specifically permitted by an 
agent of the aforesaid Government; and so soon as their boundaries 
are distinctly defined, the said Utahs are further bound to confine 
themselves to said limits . . . and they now deliberately and 
considerately, pledge . . . to confine themselves strictly to the limits 
which may be assigned them . . . .115 
In Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, the Court of Federal 
Claims provided a detailed opinion on the history of the Utah, 
aboriginal title and the Treaty with the Utah.116 The term “Utah 
Indians” refers to “any and all Indians resident in Utah, in or around 
Salt Lake City,” during the relevant time period.117 The Court  
recognized that Article VII of the Treaty with the Utah, quoted above, 
does not recognize title because the boundaries of aboriginal lands were 
                                                          
impact on vested treaty rights. Whether a group of citizens of Indian ancestry is 
descended from a treaty signatory and has maintained an organized tribal structure is 
a factual question which a district court is competent to determine.”); see also United 
States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1086 (1976) (“Once a tribe is determined to be a party to a treaty, its rights under such 
a treaty may be lost only by unequivocal action of Congress.”); see Greene v. Babbitt, 
64 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1995). 
113.  See generally Treaty with the Utah, art. I, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at art. VII. 
116.  Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 768, 786 (1993). 
117.  Id. at 773 n.5. 
17
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to be settled in the future.118 By its terms, the Treaty does not designate, 
settle, adjust, define, or assign limits or boundaries to the Indians; 
instead, it leaves such matters to the future.119 “The ratified treaty 
allowed the Indians permissive occupation and reserved a final 
settlement sometime in the future.”120 
The Treaty with the Utah did not establish any reservation for 
American Indians, including the Tribe; instead, it left such matters to 
future decisions.121 Consequently, the Treaty cannot be said to 
recognize American Indian title.122 The Treaty was made with “Utah” 
tribes and involved no cession of California lands for reservations.123 
Thus, the Treaty did not establish any title or reservation to land, and 
the Treaty did not grant title to land. 
C. Treaty with the Utah Is Not Self-Executing 
The Treaty with the Utah’s plain terms show that the Treaty was 
not self-executing.124 As the Supreme Court has noted, treaties 
generally “do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of 
express language to the contrary.”125 Whether a treaty is self-executing 
depends on whether “the treaty contains stipulations which . . . require 
no legislation to make them operative;” if so, “they have the force and 
effect of a legislative enactment.”126 To decide a dispute over whether 
a particular treaty is self-executing, courts “may look beyond the 
written words [of the treaty] to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, 
                                                          
118.  Id. at 786-87; Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1018-19 (E.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
119.  Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 768, 786-87 
(1993). 
120.  Id. at 789 (the express terms of the Treaty state that “Government shall, at 
its earliest convenience, designate, settle, and adjust their territorial boundaries.”). 
121.  See generally Treaty with the Utah, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, 1849 WL 
7601. 
122.  Uintah Ute Indians, 28 Fed. Cl. at 786.   
123.  Treaty with the Utah, art. VII, December 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, 1849 WL 
7601. 
124.  See generally id. 
125.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 492, 505 n.3 (2008).   
126.  Id. at 505-06. 
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and the practical construction adopted by the parties.”127 But even 
American Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or expanded beyond their 
clear terms to remedy an alleged injustice or to achieve the asserted 
understanding of the parties.128 
As shown from the Treaty with the Utah’s language, the 
government was to establish reservations in the future.129 The Treaty 
with the Utah was a future commitment to set aside land for the 
signatory tribes.130 Thus, the Treaty with the Utah did not grant land 
title or possession to the Kawaiisu. 
V. TREATY D, AN UNRATIFIED TREATY THAT DOES NOT GRANT TITLE 
The Tribe also relied on a grant of title in “Treaty D.”131 In 1848, 
the United States promised to honor Mexican land grants under the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.132 As stated above, Congress established 
a Board of Commissioners through the 1851 Act to effectuate the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.133 Treaty D was a promise that the United States 
would set apart, “for the sole use and occupancy,” certain reservations 
for “various tribes of Indians in the State of California,” and to provide 
tribes with goods, chattels, school houses, teachers, among other 
things.134 
Unfortunately, the United States never carried out its promises.  
Congress never ratified Treaty D.135 An unratified treaty has no force 
until ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.136 Furthermore, the 
Treaty D’s particular terms stated that it must be ratified: “This treaty 
                                                          
127.  Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943). 
128.  Id. at 432. 
129.  See Treaty with the Utah, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, 1849 WL 7601. 
130.  See id. 
131.  Treaty D, supra note 21, at art. 3, 4; 4 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFF. 
L. AND TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927). 
132.  Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 49, at art. V; see also United 
States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 641-43 (9th Cir. 1986).  
133.   Id.; Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631; Ringrose, 788 F.2d at 641. 
134.  4 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFF. L. AND TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927).  
135.  Indians of Cal. by Webb v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 583, 585-586 (1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 764 (1943); see generally Treaty D, supra note 21, at art. V. 
136.  U.S. CONST., art. II, cl. 2; SEC v. Int’l Swiss Invs. Corp., 895 F.2d 1272, 
1275 (9th Cir. 1990).   
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to be binding on the contracting parties when ratified and confirmed by 
the President and Senate of the United States of America.”137 Because 
Congress never ratified Treaty D, the Tribe claim to the disputed lands 
under Treaty D did not have any basis.138 
Indeed, the descendants of tribes in Treaty D were compensated for 
Congress’s failure to ratify the Treaty.139 Treaty D was attached to the 
complaint in Indians of California by Webb v. United States,140 which 
was brought by California’s Attorney General under the “Indians of 
California Act” of May 18, 1928.141 The Indians of California Act 
authorized “the [A]ttorney [G]eneral of the State of California to bring 
suit in the Court of Claims on behalf of the Indians of California,” who 
were defined as “all Indians who were residing in the State of California 
on June 1, 1852, and their descendants now living in said State.”142 The 
Indians of California Act authorized the Attorney General to sue the 
United States on behalf of American Indians and to seek compensation 
for land taken in the unratified treaties, such as Treaty D.143 The 
Attorney General filed the suit on August 14, 1929, and then in 1942.144 
The Court of Claims held the Indians of California were entitled to 
recover damages from the United States.145 In Round Valley Indian 
Tribes v. United States,146 the United States stipulated to a judgment on 
                                                          
137.  See generally Treaty D, supra note 21, at art. V; 4 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, 
INDIAN AFFS. L. AND TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927).  
138.  Robinson v. Salazar, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
139.  Indians of California by Webb, 98 Ct. Cl. at 583. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Advisory Council on Cal. Indian Extension Pol’y Act of 1998, H.R. 3069, 
105th Cong. § 1 (1998).  
142.  Indians of Cal. by Webb, 98 Ct. Cl. at 585 (“[P]laintiffs, herein designated 
as The Indians of California, comprise all those Indians of the various tribes, bands 
and rancherias who were living in the State of California on June 1, 1852, and their 
descendants living in the state on May 18, 1928-such definition and designation 
having been prescribed in the Jurisdictional Act [of 1928].”).   
143.  Id. at 592 (“[These Indians] did not qualify before the Commission created 
by the Act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, entitled ‘An Act to ascertain and settle the 
private land claims in the State of California.’ Therefore whatever lands they may 
have claimed became a part of the public domain of the United States.”).   
144.  Round Valley Indian Tribes v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 500, 504 (2011). 
145.  Indians of Cal. by Webb, 98 Ct. Cl. at 583. 
146.  Round Valley Indian Tribes, 97 Fed. Cl. at 504. 
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October 30, 1944 in the amount of $5,024,842.34.147 Therefore, Treaty 
D had no force and effect because it remained unratified, and its 
signatories were compensated by court judgment.  Accordingly, Treaty 
D provided no authority for the Kawaiisu’s claims to the land. 
VI. THE TEJON/SEBASTIAN “RESERVATION” STATUTORY AND 
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
The Tribe also argued that its land claims, both right to occupy and 
title to property, arose from the creation of certain reservations in 
California.148  The Tribe alleged the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation was 
established in September 1853 for the Tribe’s benefit by Edward F. 
Beale, California’s Superintendent of Indian Affairs acting on behalf of 
the United States.149 The Tribe alleged the United States Congress 
directed General Beale to establish the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation for 
the Kawaiisu in 1853.150 The Tribe cited to the Congressional Globe, 
which refers to the Tejon/Sebastian reservation.151 
“The term ‘Indian reservation’ originally meant any land reserved 
from an Indian cession to the federal government regardless of the form 
of tenure.”152 In the 1850s, the federal government frequently began to 
reserve public lands from entry for American Indian use.153 In 1853, 
Congress authorized the President “to make five military reservations 
from the public domain in the State of California or the Territories of 
Utah and New Mexico bordering on said State, for Indian purposes . . . 
                                                          
147.  Indians of Cal., 98 Ct. Cl. at 600; Round Valley Indian Tribes, 97 Fed. Cl. 
at 504 (“In fiscal year 1945, Congress appropriated $5,024,842.34 for ‘Judgments, 
Court of Claims, Department of the Interior, Indians.’”). 
148.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18,  ¶ 27. 
149.  Id. 
150.   Third Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 15. 
151.  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 27; Letter from Edward F. 
Beale to Hon. Geo. W. Maypenny (Sept. 30, 1853) (Doc. No. 92 of “Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” September 30, 1853, 33 Cong., Sess. 1, Vol. 1, Part 
1, Doc. 1, 469-472); see Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 226, 238 (“That the 
president of the United States, if upon examination he shall approve of the plan 
hereinafter provided for the protection of the Indians, be and he is hereby authorized 
to make five military reservations from the public domain the state of California….”). 
152.  NELL JESSUP NEWTON, ET AL., COHEN’S, HANDBOOK OF FED. INDIAN L., 
§ 3.04[2][c][ii] (2012). 
153.  Id.; Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 226, § 1. 
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[p]rovided, [t]hat such reservations shall not contain more than twenty 
five thousand acres.”154 The 1853 Act permitted a reservation with a 
maximum size of 25,000 acres.155 Congress has the power to diminish 
reservations unilaterally156 as long as the decision to terminate a 
reservation is expressly stated in the text of the legislation or is clear 
from the legislative history and surrounding circumstances.157 
Congress subsequently amended the 1853 Act to provide for two 
additional reservations on March 3, 1855.158 The Act of March 3, 1855 
(the “1855 Act”) appropriated funds for “collecting, removing, and 
subsisting the Indians of California . . . on two additional military 
reservations, to be selected as heretofore . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat the 
President may enlarge the quantity of reservations heretofore selected, 
equal to those hereby provided for.”159 
The Kawaiisu failed to identify any executive order establishing the 
Tejon/Sebastian Reservation under either the 1853 Act or the 1855 Act. 
But, in 1864, Congress passed “[a]n Act to provide for the Better 
Organization of Indian Affairs in California.”160 This legislation 
empowered the President to reserve four tracts of land: 
set apart . . . at his discretion, not exceeding four tracts of land, 
within the limits of [California], to be retained by the United States 
for the purposes of Indian reservations, which shall be of suitable 
extent for the accommodation of the Indians of said state, and shall 
                                                          
154.  Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 104, 10 Stat. 226, 238 (“President is . . . 
authorized to make five military reservations from the public domain in the State of 
California . . . for Indian purposes . . . reservations shall not contain more than twenty-
five thousand acres in each.”).   
155.  Id. (“[S]uch reservations shall not contain more than twenty- five thousand 
acres each [and] shall not be made on any lands inhabited by Citizens of California.”). 
The Tribe claimed that their land encompasses 270,000. Given this express act of 
Congress to establish reservations in California for Indians of no more than 25,000, it 
was unclear how the Tribe claimed more acreage than that granted by Congress. 
156.  Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 n.11 (1984). 
157.  Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). 
158.  Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 204, 10 Stat. 686, 699; see Shermoen v. United 
States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 940 (1993). 
159.  Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 204, 10 Stat. 686. 
160.  Act of Apr. 8, 1864, ch. 48, 13 Stat. 39. 
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/2
McAuliffe camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:11 AM 
2018] STOLEN OR LAWFUL? 23 
be located as remote from white settlements as may be found 
practicable . . . .161 
The Act of April 8, 1864 (the “1864 Act”) designated California as 
one American Indian superintendency and authorized the President to 
designate Indian reservations.162 Further, the 1864 Act provided that 
unretained lands be surveyed and offered for sale.163 In Mattz, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
[a]t the time of the passage of the 1864 Act there were, apparently, 
three reservations in California: the Klamath River, the Mendocino, 
and the Smith River.  It appears, also, that the President did not take 
immediate action, upon the passage of the Act, to recognize 
reservations in California.164 
The 1864 Act superseded the 1853 Act by allowing only four 
reservations in California.165 Established by Executive Order, the 
reservations were the Hoopa Reservation (established in 1876), the 
Mission Indian Reserve (established in 1870, and revised from 1877 to 
1889), the Round Valley Reservation (established 1870), and the Tule 
River Reservation (established in 1873).166 
The Tejon/Sebastian Reservation cannot provide land rights to the 
Tribe because the President did not establish the Reservation.  There is 
no executive order establishing the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation under 
                                                          
161.  Id. at ch. 48, § 2. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. at ch. 48, § 3; see generally Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 490 (1973).   
164.   Id. at 489-90. 
165.  Sermon v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1992); see 4 
CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFF. L. AND TREATIES, 1101 (1913-1927). 
166.  See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 494 (“The 1864 Act had authorized the President 
to ‘set apart’ no more than four tracts for Indian reservations in California.”); see also 
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 258-59 (1913) (“Presidents Grant, Hayes, 
Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, and Harrison, successively, acted with respect to one or 
more of these reservations upon the theory that the Act of 1864 conferred a continuing 
discretion upon the Executive; orders were made for altering and enlarging the bounds 
of the reservations, restoring portions of their territory to the public domain, and 
abolishing reservations once made, and establishing others in their stead; and in 
numerous instances Congress in effect ratified such action.”). 
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the 1853 Act or the 1855 Act.167 The 1864 Act states, “all acts or parts 
of acts in conflict with the provisions of the act, be, and the same are 
hereby, repealed . . . .”168 Also, the 1864 Act provides that “the several 
Indian reservations in California, which shall not be retained for the 
purposes of Indian reservations,” shall be sold.169 The drafters of the 
1864 Act could not have written a more precise legislation to abolish 
prior reservations, even assuming the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation 
existed.170 This means any prior act creating a reservation was repealed 
and any existing reservations, not acknowledged by the President, were 
to be sold.  Thus, even if the Sebastian/Tejon reservation had been 
established in 1853, such establishment was repealed by the 1864 Act.  
Therefore, the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation was not properly 
established and did not provide the Tribe with land rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tribe failed to establish a valid claim to the 270,000 acres.  It 
claimed rights to the land based on two theories: (1) aboriginal right to 
occupy and (2) title to the land.  Typically, an aboriginal title claim 
provides American Indians with the “right of occupancy.”  However, 
case law holds aboriginal title is lost when the Board of Commissioners, 
under the 1851 Act, validly-issued land patents to predecessors in title.  
This meant American Indian claims to occupancy are invalid against 
validly-issued land patents.  The 1851 Act followed the end of 
hostilities with Mexico, which culminated in the Treaty of Guadalupe 
                                                          
167.  The Act of 1864 required that the President establish the California 
Reservations. To the extent that there is no Executive Order creating the 
“Tejon/Sebastian Reservation,” the absence of an executive order nullifies the 
existence of such a reservation. The Act of 1864 superseded any prior act establishing 
a reservation and gave the authority to the President to create reservation. For instance, 
the Mendocino Reservation, which was established in 1856 pursuant to 1855 Act, was 
restored to the public domain by Congress on July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223.  There 
simply was no Executive action creating the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation. 
168.  Act of Apr. 8, 1864, ch. 48, 13 Stat. 39, 41(“An Act to provide for the 
Better Organization of Indian Affairs in California.”). 
169.  Id. at ch. 48, § 3. 
170.  See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505 n.22 (“Congress has used clear language of 
express termination when that result is desired,” and quoting instances where acts 
declared a reservation “abolished,” “discontinued,” or “vacated and restored to the 
public domain.”).   
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Hidalgo.  The 1851 Act not only created a Board of Commissioners to 
determine the validity of claims but also required each person “claiming 
lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived from the 
Spanish or Mexican government” to present the claim within two years.  
The Tribe’s land claims were subject to validly-issued land patents and 
were granted to predecessors in title.  Therefore, the Tribe lost any 
claim to aboriginal rights or to title, to the validly issued land patents, 
because it failed to submit a claim to the Board of Commissioners under 
the 1851 Act. 
The Tribe alleged the Treaty with the Utah granted it vast land 
rights as “elucidated” by Treaty D.  In Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. 
United States., the Court of Federal Claims wrote a detailed opinion on 
the history of the Utah, aboriginal title, and the Treaty with the Utah.  
“Utah Indians” referred to “any and all Indians resident in Utah, in or 
around Salt Lake City,” during the relevant time period, and thus did 
not apply to the Kawaiisu.  Further, the Treaty with the Utah was a 
future commitment to set aside land for the signatory tribes, not a 
document granting land title or possession.  By its terms, the Treaty 
with the Utah did not designate, settle, adjust, define, or assign limits 
or boundaries to American Indians, because the treaty left such matters 
to the future.  Treaty D did not alternatively grant land rights to the 
Tribe because Treaty D was not ratified by Congress, and its signatory 
tribes were compensated in Indians of California by Webb v. United 
States. 
The Tribe tried to establish that its land claims arose from the 
creation of the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation in California.  However, 
the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation was not a reservation established by 
any President.  Therefore, the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation could not 
have provided land rights to the Tribe.  Furthermore, there is no 
executive order establishing the Tejon/Sebastian Reservation.  Thus, 
the Kawaiisu failed to establish a valid claim to the 270,000 acres. 
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